Economic Orientations and Social Stratification: Public Opinion in Contemporary America by Prysby, Charles L.
Journal of Political Science 
Volume 7 
Number 2 (Spring) Article 4 
April 1980 
Economic Orientations and Social Stratification: Public Opinion in 
Contemporary America 
Charles L. Prysby 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Prysby, Charles L. (1980) "Economic Orientations and Social Stratification: Public Opinion in 
Contemporary America," Journal of Political Science: Vol. 7 : No. 2 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops/vol7/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Politics at CCU Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Political Science by an authorized editor of CCU Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact commons@coastal.edu. 
Economic Orientations and Social Stratification: 
Public Opinion in Contemporary America ~ 
CHARLES L. PRYSBY 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
A connection between social class and political behavior has been an 
important feature of American politics over the recent past. The New 
Deal coalition involved a political alignment partially based on social 
class, with the focus on the division between the working and middle 
classes. However, this old pattern of class polarization and politi cal 
conflict may be breaking down. In the 1972 election there was very 
little difference between the white-collar and blue -collar strata in their 
presidential vote, and class differences in party identi£cation and con-
gressional voting, while greater than those for presidential voting, were 
still fairly modest by the standards of previous elections.1 
The low level of class-based voting in the 1972 election appears to 
many as more than an aberration resulting from short-term fact ors 
unique to that election. Rather, the 1972 election is viewed as an ac-
celeration of a trend that has been occurring since 1948, a trend that 
represents a fundamental shift in the nature of American politics .2 Three 
related explanations for this change have been put forth. One explana-
tion focuses on the shift from industrial to post-industrial society as the 
source of these alterations in partisan alignments. Put simply, this view 
sees the shifts in social structure and educational attainment that accom-
pany the coming of post-industrial society as producing a more volatile 
electorate, unconcerned with traditional economic issues and unrespon-
sive to traditional class-related partisan appeals. 8 A second view sees 
0 This research was supported by the University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
through a research leave from the Office of the Chancellor and a grant from the 
Research Council. The data were made available by the Inter-University Consort-
ium for Political and Social Research, through the Institute for Research in Social 
Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill . 
1 Norval D. Glenn, "Class and Party Support in 1972," Public Opinion Quarterly, 
XXIX (Spring, 1975), pp. 117-122. 
2 For longitudinal data on the relationship between social class and partisan choice 
see orval D. Glenn, "Class and Party Support in the United States: Recent and 
Emerging Trends," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXVII (Spring 1973), pp. 1-20; and 
John W. Books and JoAnn B. Reynolds, "A Note on Class Voting in Great Britain 
and the United States," Comparative Political Studies, VII ( October, 1975 ), pp. 360-
376. 
3 Everett Carll Ladd, Jr ., and Charles D. Hadley , Transformations of the Ameri-
can Party System (New York: Norton, 1975), pp. 181-344. 
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enerational change as the source of the breakdown of class-based voting. ~ ounger voters, lacking experience with the Depression and having 
grown up in an age of affiuence, have different values and concerns than 
older voters and display less class polarization in their political behavior. 4 
Related to these arguments is the view that increased afHuence has 
diminished class divisions and produced a society where the vast major-
ity are properly characterized as middle-class. 5 Although this phenome-
non often is greatly exaggerated in the popular media, some bluning of 
the dividing line between manual and non-manual groups may have 
occurred over the past three decades, partially as a result of the expan-
sion of the service sector and the increase in routine white-collar jobs. 
All these arguments suggest that significant alterations in the struc-
ture of opinion on economic issues have taken place. The New Deal 
alignment was based, at least in part, on class-related economic issues, 
particularly the traditional economic issues of social welfare and income 
redistribution. Thus, a sharp decline in class-based voting implies one 
( or more) of the following possibilities: (a) traditional economic issues 
are much less important now, at least in relation to other issues; (b) 
traditional class differences in economic orientations are disappearing; 
( c) traditional partisan differences in economic orientation are no longer 
perceived by the electorate. This last possibility can be dismissed, for 
survey data show that the electorate's perception of partisan differences 
on economic issues has increased, not decreased, over the past two 
decades.6 Therefore, the decline in class-based voting should be a reflec-
tion of basic changes in the nature and/ or distribution of economic issue 
orientations. 
Although there has been considerable discussion, much of it journal-
istic, of the recent decline in class-based politics, there has been very 
little research into the current relationship between economic position 
and orientation on economic issues. The common assumption is that the 
better-off groups are more conservative, but we have little data on (a) 
how much difference there is ( if any) between different strata and ( b) 
which aspects of economic stratification tend to be the more important 
influences on economic attitudes. This study attempts to investigate 
these relationships. It also attempts to suggest some conceptual and 
methodological considerations that are relevant to the sutdy of economic 
issue orientations. In general the aim of this study is to explore some 
4 Paul R. Abramson, "Generational Change in American Electoral Behavior," 
American Political Science Review, LXVIII ( March, 197 4), pp. 93-105. 
6 Kurt B. Mayer, 'Tue Changing Shape of the American Class Structure," Social 
Research, XXX ( Winter, 1963), pp. 462-468. 
6 Gerald Pomper, Voters' Choice (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1975), pp. 170-
173. 
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key questions in order to provide a foundation for future research in this 
area. 
Economic Stratification and Economic Attitudes 
Most research into class-based political behavior has relied on occu-
pation as the best measure of an individual's position in the social strat-
ification system. The sharp decline in class-based voting raises the pos-
sibility that recent changes in the social structure have made occupa tion 
a less relevant indicator of economic position. The simple dichotomy 
between blue-collar and white-collar occupations, so widely used in 
social science, may not be as useful a distinction as it once was, and 
somewhat finer divisions of occupations into five or six categories may 
not be much better. 
Whatever the changes in the occupational structure, the fact remains 
that there is considerable economic stratification when it comes to the 
distribution of income and wealth. 7 Moreover, there has not been any 
drastic alteration in the inequality of the income distribution in recent 
decades .8 This suggests that income may be a better measure of economic 
stratification, at least for research into economic attitudes . Many of the 
traditional economic issues involve questions of government policy that 
have a different impact on the different income strata, but are unrelated 
to occupational strata, except insofar as they represent income levels. 9 
A third aspect of social strati£cation; education, also may influence 
economic issue 01ientations. The shift to a post-industrial society may 
be creating new economic cleavages, based on control of technical ex-
pertise, that are related to orientations on at least some economic issues.10 
In order to examine the relationship of these various aspects of social 
stratification to orientations on economic issues, recent national survey 
data were analyzed. The data employed in this study are from th e 1972 
American National Election Study conducted by the Center for Political 
Studies at the University of Michigan . In order to avoid confounding 
racial differences with stratification differences, all non-whites were 
dropped from the analysis. 
7 Relevant data are contained in Gabriel Kolko, Wealth and Power in America 
( New York: Praeger, 1962); Herman P. filler, Income Distribution in the United 
States (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Department of Commerce, 1966); and Richard F. 
Hamilton, Class and Politics in the United States (New York: Wiley, 1972), pp. 
368-398. 
s Ibid. 
9 This is not to say that various occupational groups do not have their own spe-
cific economic interests, but broad categories, such as manual and non-manual, prob-
ably are of limited usefulness when it comes to determining economic interests, eco-
nomic concerns, and economic issue orientations. 
10 Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society ( New York: Basic Books, 
1973), pp. 212-242. 
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Four dillerent economic issue orientations were used in the analysis, 
with each orientation measured by the respondent's self-placement on a 
seven-point scale. Specifically, respondents were asked to place them-
selves on scales indicating: (a) whether or not the government should 
see that every person has a job and a good standard of living;11 ( b) what 
the best tax rate would be; 12 ( c) whether or not the government should 
do everything possible to combat the problem of inflation;13 and ( d) 
whether or not the government should make every possible effort to 
improve the social and economic position of blacks and other minority 
groups.14 
These four scales represent four different types of economic issues. 
The first is a traditional social welfare issue, involving governmental 
action to insure certain minimum standards of living. The second item, 
the desirable tax rate, does involve an issue of income redistribution, 
and in that sense is similar to the first issue. However, income redistribu-
tion through the tax structure does not call for the same amount of overt 
government activity as do most social welfare programs, and thus might 
be favored by those preferring a more egalitarian social structure but 
opposed to expansion of federal government activities . The third issue, 
government action against inflation, does not explicitly involve a ques-
tion of income redistribution, making it different from the previous two 
issues. To some extent, this item taps feelings about governmental 
economic activism, although it does not differentiate between different 
types of governmental action against inflation, and there certainly is a 
difference between favoring fiscal or monetary action and favoring wage 
and price controls. Perhaps the question wording also makes this item 
a measure of the respondent's general concern over inflation. The final 
issue, government aid to minority groups, does involve issues of income 
redistribution and governmental economic activism. However, the gov-
ernment action in question would not directly benefit any of the respon-
dent groups being analyzed ( non-whites have been excluded) and 
presumably would involve some costs to these groups. In sum, these 
four issues involve in some way questions of governmental economic 
activism and/ or income redistribution . Each item is a very general 
question that should be a good measure of attitudes on the more specific 
11 The seven-point scale ran from "having the government see to it that every 
person has a job and a good standard of living" to "the government letting each per-
son get ahead on his own." 
12 The seven-point scale ran from "increasing the tax rate for high incomes" to 
"having the same tax rate for everyone." 
13 The seven-point scale ran from "total government action against inflation" to 
"no gove=ent action against inflation." 
14 The seven-point scale ran from "the government should make every possible 
effort to help minorities" to "the government should not make any special effort to 
help minorities." 
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issues that make up the issue area, and while there is some interrelatio n. 
ship among the four items, they are sufficiently distinct to be considered 
representative of a different issue area. 
As a starting point, the relationship between occupational status and 
economic attitudes is examined. Figure 1 presents the mean score on 
each of the four scales for six different occupational groups: professional 
and technical workers, managers and proprietors, clerical and sales work-
ers, skilled workers, unskilled workers, and service workers. 15 
These data do not indicate that those in higher status occupations are 
more conservative on economic issues in general. On two of the issue 
scales, the ones dealing with the tax rate and government job guarantees, 
there is no consistent relationship at all. There is a fairly clear relati on-
ship between occupational status and position on the minority aid scale, 
but it is the high status occupational groups that are more liberal here. 
Only on the question of government action against inflation do we find 
a consistent tendency for those in higher status occupations to be more 
conservative ( or more anti-governmental-action), and even here the 
relationship is not that strong. If we simply divide the respondents into 
two categories, blue-collar and white-collar, the results are similar.16 
There is virtually no difference between blue-collar and white-co llar 
respondents on the tax rate and guaranteed job scales, while the blue-
collar group is more conservative on the minority aid scale and the 
white-collar group more conservative on the inflation action scale.17 
Occupational status does not appear to be strongly related to the 
economic issue orientations examined here. Perhaps other aspects of 
social stratification are more significant. In order to examine this pos-
sibility, we can compare income, education, and occupational status in 
terms of their impact on economic issue orientations. These three aspects 
of social stratification are interrelated, so in order to determine the 
separate and independent impact of each variable, the three variab les 
were used as the independent variables in a multiple regression analysis 
of scores on each of the four economic issue scales.18 The results of the 
15 The occupation of the family head was used to classify respondents . Cases 
where the family head's occupation did not fit into one of these 6 categoeies were 
eliminated from the analysis ( e.g., farmers, students). 
16 The first 3 occupational categories were considered white-collar and the re-
maining three were classified as blue-collar. 
17 TI1e mean scores for each issue scale are: 
guar. iob tax rate in-fl. act. min. aid. 
scale sca'le scale sca'le 
white-collar . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.58 4.03 2.57 4.21 
blue-collar' . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.52 4.07 2.36 4.68 
18 For purposes of this analysis, yearly family income was treated as a seven-
category variable, running from "under $5000" up to "over $20,000." Educatio n 
was treated as a five-category variable, running from "prinlary education or less" to 
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analysis are presented in Table 1. One _can ~ee t:1at income and e~u~a-
tion are the important aspects of stratification, m terms of explammg 
conomic issue orientations, with the significant variable being income 
;or the first two issue scales and education for the last two scales. The 
influence of occupational status is extremely modest, once income and 
education are taken into account. 
Income and Economic Orientations 
The impact of income on economic issue orientations warrants further 
investigation, as there are serious problems in using income as a measure 
of social stratification. Surveys commonly record only the total annual 
family income, but this can mean many different things. There are 
geographical variations in the cost of living, so a given income may 
imply a different standard of living in different locations. Also, a given 
family income may represent the earning of one, two, or even more 
individuals, and we would expect a single individual earning a specified 
income to have different economic interests, concerns, and orientations 
than a married couple earning the same income through full-time work 
on the part of both. It would seem, then, that the use of income in this 
analysis would require the application of various corrections or adjust-
ments in order to obtain a valid measure of economic position. 
An attempt to handle the above problems can be made by applying 
some controls and excluding some respondents. The following analysis 
excludes all respondents who were neither the family head nor the spouse 
of the head ( e.g., adult children living with parents, retired parents 
living with children. ) . In such cases, total family income may not be a 
good guide to the respondent's economic situation. Also eliminated were 
married respondents who both were employed and had an employed 
spouse. Such respondents are better analyzed separately to control for 
the fact that the family income represents the joint earnings of two 
individuals.19 The following analysis thus involves white respondents 
who were either the head or the spouse of the head of a single-worker 
"college graduate." Occupation was treated as the six-category variable described 
above. Strictly speaking, the assumptions for multiple regression are not fulfilled, as 
these data are ordinal rather than interval. But considering the nature of the data 
( the number of categories and the general disribution), the use of regression analysis 
should be acceptable. A check on the results of the multiple regression through the 
use of contingency tables does not indicate that any unwarranted conclusions are 
derived from the use of the more sophisticated methods. 
19 The analysis that follows also was carried out for these respondents. The over-
all pattern of results for this group generally is similar to the findings discussed in 
this paper. Some differences do exist, but it is not clear whether these represent true 
differences or fluctuations due to sampling error and other random factors. The data 
for these respondents are not reported because the relatively small number of re-
spondents make the findings tentative. 
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family. Controls for region and community size were introduce d in an 
attempt to control for differences in the cost of living. Of course, the 
above exclusions and controls still do not make family income a perfect 
measure of the respond ent's economic position, but they proba bly im-
prove its validity considerably. 
Table 2 presents the relationship between income and each of the 
economic issue orientations for four respondent groups: urban North-
erners, urban Southerners, rural No1therners, and rural Southerners.20 
For economy of presentation only the gamma for the association betw een 
income and the specified issue orientation is reported for each pop ulation 
group, with the partial gamma used as a summary measure . The data 
show that income is related to orientations on the first three issues and 
that the relationship is in the expected direction ( i.e., the lower-i ncome 
groups tend to be more libera l or pro-governmental-action) . However, 
the relationship is weak in the case of the tax rate issue and only of 
modest strength for the first and third issues. 
Although the relationships are not particularly strong, they are greater 
than the simple relationships between these economic issue orientations 
and family income without any of the exclusions or controls tha t were 
applied in the analysis for Table 2. This not only indicates the validity 
of such exclusions and controls, but also suggests that we migh t obtain 
stronger relationships between income and economic attitudes if we were 
able t o apply a more precise and thorough set of corrections and adjust-
ments. 
It is interesting to note that the relationships are considera bly stron ger 
in the rural areas, as this is somewhat at odds with the view that class 
polarization is more a feature of urban life. Some explanati ons of elec-
toral realignmen t in the South, for example, stress the connectio n be-
tween growing Republicanism, class polarization, and urbaniz ation.21 
Perhaps the relationship between occupation and partisan choice is 
greater in urban areas than in rural areas, but these data show that for 
economic attitudes there is more difference between upper and lower 
income groups in rural areas th an there is in urban areas . 
The impact of income on economic attitudes also may be examined 
for different age groups ( see Table 3), a relevant analysis considering the 
20 See Hamilton, op. cit., pp. 239-308, for information justifying these controls. 
Respondents were considered urban residents if they lived in an SMSA. The South 
was defined as the eleven states of the Confederacy plus Kentucky, Maryland, Okla-
homa, West Virginia, and Washington . 
21 See Donald S. Strong, "Further Reflections on Southern Politics," Journal of 
Politics, XXXIII (May, 1971), pp. 239-256; and Anthony M. Orum and Edwar d W. 
McCranie, "Class, Tradition, and Partisan Alignments in a Southern Urban Elector-
ate," Journal of Politics XXXII (February, 1970), pp. 156-176. 
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nerational differences in class-based voting that have been pointed out f; others.22 Age group differences are not particularly pronounced for 
the first two issues, although one can see that on the question of govern-
ent job and living standard guarantees there is a stronger connection 
:etween income and issue orientation among the older respondents. 
Clear age group differences are present for the issue of government 
action against inflation; the relationship of income to issue orientation 
ranges from nonexistent for the under-35 group to relatively strong for 
the over-54 group. These results are quite explicable when it is remem-
bered that this item is more a measure of concern over inflation rather 
than orientation toward potential ways of combating inflation. Age 
group differences also exist for the final issue, where we find that a 
lower income is associated with a more liberal response among the young 
but the opposite is true for the older groups, but it is not clear what 
conclusions should be drawn from these findings. In general, the data 
in Table 3, while pointing out some interesting age group differences, do 
not indicate that the relationships between income and economic issue 
orientations are greatly weaker for the young. 
Economic Satisfaction and Economic Orientations 
The above data do not show objective economic position to be very 
strongly related to economic attitudes. At best, moderate connections 
are observed. Perhaps this reflects the fact that different individuals may 
react to the same economic situation in different ways. Instead of focus-
ing only on an individual's objective economic situation, we might also 
consider the individual's subjective assessment of that situation. In order 
to do this, a measure of the respondent's satisfaction with his income 
level was introduced into the analysis.23 As one might expect, satisfac-
tion with income is related to actual income level. Although the relation-
is far from perfect ( there are many dissatisfied high-income individuals 
and many satisfied low-income individuals), it is necessary to control 
for actual income level when examining the impact of satisfaction with 
income on economic attitudes. 
We might predict several attitudinal characteristics for dissatisfied 
individuals ( as compared to the more satisfied) : (a) they should be 
more likely to cite economic problems as important political or govern-
mental issues; (b) they should be more critical of or dissatisfied with 
existing economic policy; and ( c) they should be more likely to favor 
governmental policies that would be of direct economic benefit to them. 
22 Abramson, op. cit. 23 Respondents were asked to place themselves on a seven-point scale running 
from extremely satisfied to extremely dissatisfied. 
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This follows from the simple idea that those who are dissatisfied with 
their economic situation are likely to respond in political tem1s, wanting 
governm ent policies that ameliorate their economic condition. No doubt 
not all will respond this way, but some general tendencies should be 
evident. 
Tables 4 and 5 show how concern over economic problems is related 
to income and satisfaction with income.24 Table 4 contains, for each 
specified population group , the mean score on a scale measuring satis-
faction with government economic policy. 25 Clearly , both a higher in-
come and greater personal satisfaction with income have an impact on 
satisfaction with government economic policy. It also appears that satis-
faction with government policy is more related to satisfaction with in-
come than to actual income, thus indicating the relevance of including 
measures of subjective satisfaction with personal economic condition. 
Table 5 contains, for each population group , the percentage indicating 
that the most important problem facing the government was an economic 
problem. 26 Contrary to expectations, these data indicate that satisfac tion 
with income is umelated to the importance placed on economic problems. 
The high income group is the most likely to name a non-economic prob-
lem as most important, but this is not due to higher levels of income sat-
isfaction that characterize this group , and the middle income group is 
slightly more likely than the low income group to name an economic 
problem as most important. This pattern of responses seems surpris ing, 
particularly considering the clear relationships that were present in 
Table 4. 
Table 6 contains scores on each of the four economic issue orientation 
scales by income and satisfaction with income. For economy of presenta-
tion, the mean scale score is presented for each group. These data 
indicate that for the :first three issues those low in satisfaction are more 
likely to have a liberal or pro-government-action response. This is ex-
pected for most of the cases, but there are some places where this seems 
odd. For example, the high income group probably would not receive 
much direct benefit from any government program to insure a job and 
24 In order to reduce the number of cells in these two tables to a more readable 
number, both income and satisfaction with income were reduced from seven-point 
scales to trichotomous variables ( with a roughly equal number of respondents in 
each variable category). 
25 This was a seven-point scale that respondents placed themselves on, with the 
scale extremes being highly satisfied and highly dissatisfied. A lower mean score 
indicates greater satisfaction with government economic policy. 
26 Respondents were asked to name the single most important problem that the 
country faced. Problems classi£ed as economic includ ed problems of inflation, social 
welfare policies, economic growth and prosperity, taxation and government spend· 
ing, and other miscellaneous economic items. 
ECONOMIC ORIENTATIONS AND SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 139 
od standard of living for everyone; in fact, such a program probably 
g:ould involve some direct costs to this group. Therefore, one would 
:>-'Peet that it would be the more satisfied members of the high income 
roup who would be most supportive of such a program; those with 
fower levels of income satisfaction should be the most opposed to govern-
ment programs to improve the economic condition of others. However 
reasonable these arguments are, the data clearly do not support this line 
of reasoning. The same arguments and contradictory findings also apply 
to the tax rate issue, except that the wording of the question may make 
these results explicable. 27 
For the inflation issue, it makes sense to find that the dissatisfied at 
each income level are more in favor of government action against infla-
tion. Their increased concern over inflation probably reflects one of the 
reasons for their dissatisfaction. One might also note that for any given 
level of satisfaction , the low income groups are more in favor of govern-
ment action to stem inflation. 
There is little relationship between satisfaction with income and ori-
entation on the fourth issue ( government aid to minorities). Following 
the line of reasoning advanced above, we might expect that those who 
were dissatisfied with their own economic situation would be the most 
opposed to the government providing aid to minorities, but the data 
again fail to support such an argument. 
These results suggest that dissatisfaction with personal economic situa-
tion leads to more liberal ( or pro-governmental-action) orientations on 
economic issues. This tendency appears to be the case even when the 
more liberal position does not seem to be in the direct economic interest 
of the individual. Furthermore, the relationship seems too consistent to 
be explained away by such things as differences in the way respondents 
interpreted the questions or perceived their own economic interests. 
Further research certainly is necessary to confirm this unexpected find-
ing, but the analysis results at least indicate an interesting area of re· 
search. 
Conclusion 
The extent of class-based voting may be disappearing and the nature 
of the social structure may be changing, but this study shows that social 
stratification differences still are related to economic issue orientations. 
Occupation, however, no longer is the most relevant aspect of social 
27 Those respondents classified as high-income who indicated that they favored 
incr~asing the tax rate on high incomes may not have felt that their own earnings 
fell mto that category. Their own concept of high income might have been a very 
narrow one. Hence, raising taxes for the wealthy, which is what these respondents 
mlasay. have ha~ in mind, would not imply higher taxes for most of the respondents 
c sified as high-income (i.e., greater than $ll,000) in this analysis. 
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stratification. Instead, income and education appear to be the impor tant 
determinants of economic attitudes, and future research should concen-
trate on these two variables. However , income must be used in a more 
sophisticated fashion than it usually is, as various corrections and adjust-
ments need to be applied in order to arrive at a true picture of the 
respondent's economic situation. In addition to objective measures of 
socio-economic position, it is worthwhile to include subjective assess-
ments of personal economic situation. Such feelings may have an impact 
on both concern over economic issues and actual issue orientati ons. 
Bringing measures of subjective assessment of economic situation into 
the analysis does not make objective measures of economic position 
irrelevant, though, as the data also show that actual income is related 
to economic issue orientations even when satisfaction with income is 
taken into account . 
The results of this study should be taken as suggestions for further 
research, not as definite conclusions. Further researc h into this area 
appears desirable and worthwhile. The aim of this study simply has 
been to examine some questions that are relevant for future research 
and to suggest some appropriate methodological and conceptual ap-
proaches for investigating the basis of contemporary public opinion on 
economic issues. 
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FIGURE 1. Mean Scores on Four Economic Attitude Scales for Dif-
ferent Occupational Groups 11 
5.0 
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0 This chart indicates the mean score on each of the foUI economic issue orientation 
scales for six different occupational groups ( defined by the occupation of the head 
of the household). Non-whites are excluded from the analysis. A lower scale score 
indicates a more liberal ( or pro-governmental-action) response. 
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TABLE I. Prediction of Economic Issue Orientation from Three As. 
pects of Stratification° 
Aspect of Stratification 
Occupat ional 
Economic Issue: Income Education Stat us 
1. Govt. guar. of jobs and living 
standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 .01 .04 
2. Desirable tax rate . . . . . . . . . . .09 -.06 .01 
3. Govt. action against inflation . .04 .12 -.02 
4. Govt. aid to minorities . . . . . . .02 -.17 .07 
0 The entries in each row represent the betas from a multiple regression predicti on 
of the specified economic issue orientation using the three aspects of stratification 
as independent variables. The beta in each cell therefore indicates the individual 
impact of that aspect of stratification after talcing into account the impact of the 
other two aspects of stratification. A positive beta indicates that increases in the 
independent variable are associated with a more conservative ( or less pro-govern-
mental-action) orientation on the economic issue. Non-whites are excluded from 
the analysis. 
TABLE 2. Relationship Between Income and Economic Issue Orienta-
tions0 
urban urban rural rural partial 
Economic Issue: North South North South gamma 
1. Govt. guar. of jobs 
and living standard .12 .07 .20 .23 .13 
(599) (188) (263) (194) 
2. Desirable tax rate . .06 .05 .13 .08 .07 
(573) (190) (261) (181) 
3. Govt. action against 
inflation .... .15 .09 .16 .13 .15 
(609) (203) (249) (192) 
4. Govt. aid to 
minorities .. ' .. ' .00 -.03 .03 .01 .00 
(569) (183) (231) (178) 
0 The cells in each row contain the gammas for the relationship between income and 
orientation on the particular economic issue, by the indicated geographical divi-
sions. The final column contains the partial (second-order) gamma. The number 
of respondents is in parentheses. A positive gamma indicates that a lower income 
is associated with a more liberal or pro-governmental-action response. The data in 
the table are for whites who were either the head or the spouse of the head of a 
single-worker family. 
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TABLE 3. Relationship Between Income and Economic Issue Orienta-
tions by Age Group 0 
Age Group partial 
Economic Issue: <35 35-54 >54 gamma 
I. Govt. guar. of jobs and living 
.12 .08 .21 .14 standard . . . . . . . 
(401) (396) (443) 
2. Desirabl e tax rate . . . . . . . . . . .08 .08 .06 .07 (396) (388) (417) 
3. Govt. action against inflation .02 .13 .24 .13 (402) ( 413) (435) 
4. Govt aid to minorities . ..... .10 -.18 -.06 -.05 
(374) (383) (400) 
• The cells in each row contain the gammas for the relationship between income and 
orientation on the particular economic issue, by the indicated age divisions. The 
partial gamma is in the final column. The number of respondents is in parentheses . 
A positive gamma indicates that a lower income is associated with a more liberal 
or pro-governmental-action response. The data in the table are for whites who 
were either the head or the spouse of the head of a single-worker family. 
TABLE 4. Satisfaction with Government Economic Policy by Income 
and Satisfaction with Income 0 
Income 
$7000-
Satisfaction with income <$7000 $11000 >$11000 
Low .............. 4.59 ( 111) 4.93 (60) 4.92 (36) 
Med. ....... .. .... . . ... 4.32 ( 85) 4.27 (64) 4.12 (60) 
High ....... ' ....... - .. 4.20 ( 50) 4.20 (44) 4.01 (70) 
0 The entry in each cell is the mean score on the satisfaction with government eco-
nomic policy scale, for respondents with the indicated income and level of satis-
faction with income. A low score indicates greater satisfaction with government 
economic policy. The number of respondents is in parentheses. The data in the 
table are for whites who were either the head or the spouse of the head of a sin-
gle-worker family. 
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TABLE 5. Importance of Economic Problems by Income and Satisfac. 
tion with Income 0 
Satisfaction with income 
Low ... ................ . 
Med . . ................. . 
High ... ........... . ... . 
<$7000 
30% (86) 
44% (64) 
40% (35) 
l11Come 
$7000-
$11000 
40% (52) 
42% ( 55) 
29% (35) 
>$1100() 
22% (37) 
27% (52) 
30% (61) 
0 The entry in each cell is the percentage naming an economic problem as the most 
important national problem, for respondents with the indicated income and level 
of satisfaction with income. The number of respondents is in parentheses. The 
data in the table are for whites who were either the head or the spouse of the head 
of a single-worker family. 
TABLE 6. Economic Issue Orientations by Income and Satisfaction with Income 0 
Income 
<$7000 $7000-$11000 >$11000 
Satisfaction With Income 
Economic Issues: High Med. Low High Med. Low High Med. Low 
1. Govt. guar. of jobs and living 
standard . .... . ...... ... . .. 4.64 4.64 3.99 4.79 4.58 4.22 4.95 4.88 4.43 
(45) (71) (108) (43) (59) (58) (63) (58) (37) 
2. Desirable tax rate .......... 3.95 3.74 3.61 3.82 4.13 3.95 4.29 4.35 3.39 
( 44) (73) (102) (50) (62) (59) (66) (60) (38) 
3. Govt. action against inflation . 2.20 2.37 1.94 2.50 2.40 2.30 2.94 2.69 2.65 
(49) (76) (102) (42) (58) (60) (64) (61) (34) 
4. Govt. aid to minorities ..... 4.34 4.53 4.29 4.49 4.35 4.68 4.27 4.24 4.11 
( 47) (72) (107) (41) (60) (57) (67) (55) (37) 
0 The cells in each row contain the mean score on the particular issue orientation scale, for the respondents with the indicated 
income and level of satisfaction with income. A low score indicates a more liberal or pro-governmental-action orientation . The 
number of respondents is in parentheses. The data in the table are for whites who were either the head or the spouse of the head 
of a single-worker family. 
